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ABSTRACT
Sincethe early 50s, the percent of the workforce organized by unions
has declined considerably.In the most recent decade that rate of decline
has accelerated sharply. In an attempt to discover what factors can account
for the overall decline and the further deterioration during the 70s, we
decompose the sources of growth and decline to determine the relative
importance of changes in organizing activity, success in certification elec-
tions, decertifications, and net growth due to economic causes.
We find that all factors except decertifications account for a substantial
part of the change. In addition, interactions between the factors are very
important. A significant finding is that while organizing activity and suc-
cess rates have been declining over time, the net growth (or loss) of
membership due to economic causes has remained stable controlling for the
aggregate level of economic activity. We argue that this finding is incon-
sistent with the prevailing view that the decline in the percent of the work-
force organized is primarily due to the decline of the heavily unionized core
industries.
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1.Introduction
Between 1950 and 1954 the percent of private non-agricultural wage or
salary workers who were members of national labor unions or local affiliates
of national labor organizations increased nearly one percent a year to a
high of 39.2%. Since then that percentage has continued to fall reaching a
low of 23.6% in 1980.' For most of this period the total number of union
members was increasing, but in recent years even that number has been
falling.Previous studies of union growth and decline have considered why
changes in union membership have taken place.2 This paper considers a
different, though related question -- how changes in the percent of the
work force organized have taken place.
A union's membership may grow if it organizes new bargaining units,
if already organized plants increase their employment, or if a contract is
extended to cover workers in a new plant. Unions may lose members
through a decertification election, layoffs, plant closures, and by voluntar-
ily leaving a plant where they have failed to negotiate a contract after win-
ning a union representation election. This paper begins the job of deter-
mining how much change is accounted for by each of these causes.It also
considers how things might be different if certain flows had not changed.
By considering several "what-if" scenarios we can determine which factors
account for the change from the rapid growth of union membership during
the early 1950s to the accelerating decline during the 1970s. We can also
project these trends and consider the magnitude of the changes that would
be necessary to reverse them.
Despite the lack of conclusive statistical evidence, many people seem to
have strong opinions about the source of union decline. One widely held
belief is that "economic forces": plant closures, layoffs and slower growth3
in the core manufacturing industries -- the site of the greater concentra-
tions of unionism -- are primarly responsible for the decline. On the other
hand, some have argued that the decline is due more to increased manage-
ment resistance to union certification efforts resulting in a lower organizing
and success rate.3 The analysis presented here, besides satisfying an
intrinsic interest in the relative size of different flows in and out of the
union sector, allows us to begin to consider the likely importance of these
causes of union decline.
Considerable effort is now being expended in the detailed examination
of several supposed causes of union decline. Before running down blind
alleys, it is worthwhile to consider the relative importance of these different
causes. Because of the startling paucity of basic data on unions, this
paper takes the reasonable first step of combining the shards ofinformation
that are available in a simple analytic framework and asking whether the
proposed explanations can be made consistent with the data. Our findings
in this paper provide a framework within which more intensive and detailed
studies of union decline may be placed.
The rest of this paper proceeds in three sections. Section II de-
scribes the data used and presents our estimates of the historical rates of
organizing, organizing success, etc. Section III considers how union mem-
bership levels would be different if certain historical rates had been differ-
ent. Section IV is a conclusion which reviews our finding, and considers
their implications for theories of why the percent of the workforce organ-
ized has been declining, for future research, and for the future of the
U.S. union movement.4
II.Historical Rates
Many of the essential "facts" of union decline are neither well known
nor directly accessible. For example the organizing rate must be carefully
constructed from diverse sources, and the rate of growth due to "economic"
forces must be calculated as a residual. This section describes our efforts
to identify the time paths of these rates from 1950-1980.
There were four major sources of data used for this study. The
NLRB annual reports from 1949-1980 provided information on the number of
eligible voters in union certification and decertification elections, and the
number in elections where union representation was chosen.,4 The BLS's
annual survey of U.S. unions was our source for the number of union
members in each year5 supplemented with membership data on particular
public-sector unions from the AFL-CIO's 1981 and 1955 convention Proceed-
ings.6 Finally, employment figures were obtained from the 1982 Economic
port of the President.
It is widely known that the recent experience of unions in the public
sector has differed markedly from that of unions in the private sector,
largely because of major changes in the laws restricting public sector col-
lective bargaining. The analysis here focuses solely on experience in the
private sector. For the purpose of this analysis, we have removed large
public-sector unions such as AFSCME and the AFT from the union member-
ship statistics.
Because construction unions are atypical in doing most of theirorgan-
izing outside the NLRB election process, we have also removed construction
workers from all stocks and flows.7 Alternative calculations including
construction workers show no substantive differences, other than increasing
slightly the relative importance of net "economic" forces.5
Table 1 presents the historic average membership, organizing and
success rates computed from the above data using a few assumptionsde-
scribed below.
Table 1 about here
Let us look first at the rate of organizing. This is defined as the
percent of currently unorganized workers taking part incertification elec-
tions. The number of employees who are not union members can be easily
ascertained from the data described above. Estimating the proportion of
these involved in certification elections poses some problems.
We must take care that the flow statistics (largely from the NLRB) are
consistent with the stock statistics (largely from the BLS). The first
problem is that not all certification elections are conducted by theNLRB.
Some are conducted by state labor relations boards, others are conducted
by the Federal Mediation Service. Luckily, the number involvingnational
labor unions is small.8 It is also offset by a second problem -- that some
NLRB elections involve professional associations and unaffiliated local unions
which are not counted as national unions by the BLS. This number is also
relatively small9 and the consequences of ignoring both these problems are
offsetting and unlikely to be significant.
A third problem is that not all certification elections conducted by the
NLRBinvolvepreviously unorganized workers. Some elections take place
when one union "raids° another and some are attempts to organize inactive
bargaining units of other unions. Between 1976 and 1981 elections of this
type ranged from 2 to 7 percent of all workers.'0 What we cannottell is6
what proportion of these are raids where the members are already counted
as union members as opposed to the organization of inactive units where
workers are not counted as union members. All results reported in this
paper were estimated assuming that 5% percent of workers involved in
elections were already counted as union members. Results were insensitve
to changes in this assumption within reasonable bounds.
Figure 1 about here
Given these caveats Figure 1 shows that the rate of organization fell
through most of the 1950s, remained constant during most of the the 1960s
and dropped again during the late 1960s and 1970s, These results are due
both to changes in the numerator and the denominator of the organizing
rate. Employment was growing during most of this period.In addition, by
any measure, -- even the number of workers being organized -- organizing
activity fell during the 1950s and 1970s and remained roughly stable during
the 196Os.
The success rate is defined as the ratio of the number of previously
unorganized eligible voters in units choosing representation to the total of
all eligible voters in previously unorganized units. The considerations that
complicated the estimation of the organizing rate are also a problem here.
But, once again the small number of cases involved means that the estimates
based on the available data are likely to bevery good.
Figure 2 about here7
The history for the success rate in Figure 2 is similar to that of the
ora'ization ratea sharp decline during the 1950s, a slower decline in
the 1960s with a jump in 1965, and another sharp decline in the early
19]Os. The late 1970s are relatively stable.
The decertification rate is defined as the percent of all union members
involved in decertification elections in a year. As with the organization and
success rates the NLRB records do not cover all relevant elections and do
include some elections involving groups which do not fit our definition of a
union. Once again the small numbers of these types of elections make it
unlikely that ignoring them would significantly affect the results.
Figure .3 about here
The decertification rate shown in Figure 3 has gone up by over 300
percent since 1950. Most of this increase has taken place in the last five
years. However, the most notable aspect of the history of the decertifica-
tion rate is that it has never been very large. Even at its highest and if
every election resulted in decertification, it would take over 15 years for
decertifications to cause a one percent drop in the percent of the labor
force organized -- all other things held constant. Decertifications may be a
nuisance to unions, but they can not account for even a small fraction of
the decline in membership.
The decertification success rate is defined as the ratio of the number
of eligible voters in units choosing to decertify their union to eligible
voters in all decertification elections. Through the late 1960s this number
varies a great deal -- from a low of 31 percent in 1968 to a high of 638
percent in 1957 as shown in Figure 4.In the 1970s the variation has
diminished and there appears to have been a slight upward trend.
Figure 4 about here
Having computed these four rates we may now examine the inflow of
union members through the certification process net of the loss due to
decertifications. But, first we must deal with two problems. Multiplying
the organization rate times the success rate gives us the ratio of workers in
new collective bargaining units to previously unorganized workers. How-
ever, not all these workers will become union members. ln right-to-work
states many workers covered by collective bargaining agreements will not
pay union dues or be counted as union members. About nine percent of all
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements nationwide are not
union members.'2
The second problem is that many new bargaining units fail to negotiate
a contract. When this happens either the unit votes to decertify or itmay
become inactive.In the latter case the workers will not be counted as
union members and we will have no record of them leaving the union sector.
Richard Prosten of the AFL-CIO reported that in asurvey of 2,656 union
representation elections held in 1970, 22.4 percent of the units where
unions were certified did not have a contract when contacted fiveyears
later. 13 The units which failed to get a contract tended to be smaller
units, so only 13.6 percent of new members were in units which failed to
negotiate a contract. Some of these had decertified, and some firms had
gone out of business.In others, the union had become inactive. More9
recently, Charles McDonald of the AFL-CIO'4 has examined success rates in
new units with over 100 workers. He found that contracts were obtained in
63% of all such units within a 3 year period after the election. However,
only 56% were successful in obtaining a second contract. Once again many
of these firms decertified, moved, or went out of business, but in others
the union had become inactive.Firms going out of business are properly
counted as losses due to economic circumstances. We have dealt with the
other cases in which certifications do not result in union membership by
assuming that 12 percent of the employees involved in certification elections
won by unions never become union members. In many cases, decertification
elections involve inactive units, so we also assume that half of all workers
involved in decertification elections are not counted as union members at the
time.
Figure 5 about here
Although the resulting numbers vary slightly depending on the assump-
tions made, the overall trend is the same.15 The growth rate due to certifi-
cations net of decertification losses declined rapidly during the early 1950s,
leveled off during the late 1950s, and began falling again in the late 1960s
or early 1970s.
This net growth of membership through representation elections can be
compared to the total growth or loss of union members in each year. The
difference is the loss or gain due to a number of causes including plant
closing, layoffs, new hires and the extension of contracts to new plants.
We will refer to these as 'economic" causes.16 There is considerable year10
to year variation in this number, as Figure 5 shows. Some of this variation
may be due to errors in reporting total membership1-7 but even the five
year averages in Table 1 show considerable variation.
What is most interesting about these numbers is that although the
growth of union membership due to "economic" causes has been significantly
negative during the most recent period, this experience is neither unique
nor part of any long term trend. Loss of membership due to economic
causes was larger in percentage terms in the early 1960s than the late
1970s. 18 The period when growth due to those causes wasgreatest was not
the early 1950s, when total growth was highest, but the late 1960s. Fur-
ther, a regression of the growth rate due to "economic" causes on the
growth rate of GNP (Table 2) yields a strong cyclical relation but no evi-
dence of a secular decline. Coefficients on thecontemporaneous percent
change in GNP and GNP lagged once are large and significantly different
from zero. The coefficient on the time trend is positive andextremely
small. Given the size of the standard error we can not ruleout a large
negative trend. But, point estimates suggest a stable relation.Further, a
Chow test fails to reject the hypothesis that the relation is thesame in the
first 16 years as in the last 15 years. Estimated coefficientsare only
marginally different in the two periods.
Table 2 about here
In summary, the early 1950s was a period ofrapid increase in the
percent of the workforce organized while the decade of the 1970ssaw a
large slide to the lowest levels of unionization in postwar history.Although11
the rate of decertification activity was increasing during this period it was
sufficiently low to have had no perceivable impact on percent organized.
Instead, three other factors can be identified as being potentially important
in explaining the slide in the 1970s and the difference between the early
1950s and the rest of the period under study. Both organizing activity and
success rates in NLRB elections were very high during the early 1950s.In
addition the early 1950s saw the lowest rate of labor force growth and one
of second highest rates of growth of membership due to 'economic' reasons.
In contrast, the 1970s saw the lowest levels of organizing and organizing
success, the highest rate of labor force growth and a net loss of members
due to economic causes. The determination of the relative importance of
these different causes is taken up in the next section.
II!. Analysis
In this secton we attempt to determine how much of the decline in the
growth rate of union membership between the early 50s and the more recent
period can be accounted for by each of three factors:1. Organizing acti-
vity, 2. Success rates in NLRB elections, and 3. Net economic causes.
As a first step we may look to see if historically relevant levels of any
one of the three factors could have maintained the level of union membership
that was experienced in the early 50s through to 198O given the actual time
path of the other two variables. 19 The answer is a clear no.
First, average success rates in excess of 100% would have been re-
quired in each period to maintain membership levels at their peak. Second,
as Table 3 shows, the values of the organizing rate and the growth rate
due to economic causes which would have been required during the late SOs
and 70s are considerably larger than any five year average for those values12
during the period under study.2°
Table 3 about here
Since none of these factors approaches being able to account for the
difference between the early 50s and the more recent period by itself,we
conduct the following exercise to determine the relative importance of each
factor.
Figure 6 depicts the actual time path of the percent of workers organ-
ized and five counter-factual paths:
1.The path if the success rate had remained at its 1950-1954 aver-
age value and all other rates followed their historical paths.
2.The path if only the organizing rate had remained at its 1950-1954
average value.
3.The path if both the organizing and success rates had stayed at
their average levels for the 1950-1954 period.
4.The path if only the net growth rate due to economiccauses had
remained at its 1950-1954 average value.
5.The path if organizing activity, success rates and netgrowth due
to economic factors had all remained at their 1950-1954average
values.
If all three values had remained at their 50-54averages membership
would have continued to increase fairly smoothly for the whole period reach-
ing a level of nearly 41.3% in 1980. Instead, membership dropped to 21.2%.
How much of the difference can be accounted for by each factorby itself?
If the organization rate had remained constant the percent ofemployed13
workers who were union members would have dropped to about 27% in 1980.
Thus this factor can account for only about 30% of the difference.
If only the success rate had remained constant the percent organized
would again have fallen off to 25%. Thus only about 17% of the difference
can be accounted for by this factor.
Of the three individual factors, net growth due to economic factors
explains the greatest part of the difference. With that rate fixed member-
ship rises to a peak of 38% in 1958 and falls off to 28% in 1980. Thus this
factor alone can account for about 35% of the difference.
The effects attrbuted to the three individual factors do not sum to
one. This is because there is substantial interaction between these factors.
Individually, organizing and success rates account for only 47% of the
difference, but fixing both of them simultaneously we can account for 63%.
This is because the terms enter multiplicatively -- a higher success rate
applied to a higher number of elections results in far more union members
than a single increase. The remaining 37% of the difference is due to net
economic growth directly and its interaction with the other two factors.
Thus Figure 6 presents four notable findings.First, comparing the
actual union share of the workforce in 1954 with that in 1980 understates
the drastic reversal of unions fortunes since 1954;it is fruitful to ask not
only how unions have declined, but also how it is that they have ceased to
grow. Second, even if unions had won 3/4ths of the elections they were
involved in since 1950, their share of employment would still have fallen
nearly as much as it has.2' Third, even if union growth due to economic
factors continued as in the early SOs, the percent organized would still
have declined - especially in the late 1970s. Fourth, of the factors con-
sidered, only holding both organizing and success rates at their early SOs14
heights could have come close to maintaining the unions' share of the work-
force.
IV. Conclusion
The figures presented in Section II point to a number of factors which
can help account for the decline in the percent of the workforce organized
since the mid 1950s. Comparing the 1970s to the early 1950s the rate of
organization is down -- even the absolute number of workers being organ-
ized is down. In addition, the success rate of union organizing is substan-
tially lower, the labor force is growing substantially faster, the rate of de-
certification is higher and the net growth of union membership due to
economic causes is lower. Of these factors the only one that does not play
a major role in explaining the change is the loss of members due to decerti-
fications. Among the remaining factors all are at historical lows during the
last half of the 1970s except for the net growth due to economic causes.
What the analysis in Section Ill shows is that no single factor can ac-
count for the decline in the percent of the workforce organized since the
early 50s.Further, while fixing both the level of organizing activity rela-
tive to union membership and the success rate of organizing activity results
in only a slight drop in percent organized over the entire period (1955-1980)
of about 2.3 percent, only by fixing those rates and the net growth rate
due to economic causes at early 1950s rates can a decline be prevented.
What are the implications of these findings? First, while a deteriora-
tion in the economic conditions facing the highly unionized industries in the
70s could explain a decrease in both the net growth of unionmembership
due to economic causes and growth from representation elections, thisstory
is not consistent with the observation that there have been periods such as15
the early 1960s which were "economically" much worse for union firms when
organizing activity was greater and more successful.Further, the argu-
ment that the decline in organizing activity and success are due to a drying
up of opportunities resulting from the decline of the core industries is not
consistent with the observation that the percent of the workforce organized
in these core industries has been falling.22 Finally, as was noted in Section
II, the recent experience with respect to employment growth in union firms
is not out of line with the record of past decades given the recent level of
economic activity. What is unusual is the low level of organizing activity
and the extremely low success rates. This could be explained by a de-
crease in both the extent and intensity of union organizing efforts or by a
decreased willingness on the part of workers to join unions. The latter
could lead the unions to invest less effort in organizing units with lower
possibilities of success. The decreased willingness of workers to vote union
could be due to attitudinal changes or to an increase in management resis-
tance as has been suggested by some. in any case, theories which explain
the drop in percent organized by reference to the historically low rate of
organizing and success derive more support from these results than those
that suggest that there is anything unusual about the recent economic
position of organized firms.23
What are the implications of these findings for future union growth?
The answer to this question must depend on which trends one chooses to
project. However, a few simple extrapolations may prove instructive.
During the 1970s the total number of private sector non-construction
union members remained roughly constant.If that number remains constant
and employment continues to expand at about 2.5% per year the percent
organized will fall below 15% before 1995 -- plenty of time for structural16
changes to reverse current trends.
What would it take for the percent of employed workers organized to
expand? Given the rates of labor force growth that are predicted for the
near future, it would most likely require both a substantial improvement in
the economic performance of union firms and a large increase in both the
amount of organizing and its success.
Such changes are probably beyond the magnitudes that the union
movement by itself could effect. Perhaps a deliberate effort to increase the
extent and intensity of organizing in the new growth industries could be
successful in reversing trends, but that would only be the case if increased
union efforts would lead to higher success rates.
Finally, what are the implications for future research? First, there is
a surprising paucity of basic data on union activity. No information is
available in any organized form on the activity of state labor relations
board. No data on the economic performance of union establishments rela-
tive to non-union establishments is readily accessible.It would be instruc-
tive if we could decompose the loss of membership due to "net economic
cause&' but that is impossible given existing data.
Second, while considerable effort has gone into the study of the deter-
minants of organizing success little work has been done on the determinants
of organizing activity24 and virtually no analysis exists of the determinants
of differences in the net rate of change due to economic causes.25 The fact
that these do not all move together in a lock step suggests that aggregate
models of union growth do not tell the whole story and that there may be
much to gain in understanding and predictive accuracy by looking at each
element separately. This paper presents a first step in that direction.17
FOOTNOTES
1.This is not exactly correct since union membership figures include
some unemployed workers. Since we don't know the number of unem-
ployed workers the alternative would be to compute the percent of the
labor force who are union members. This approach also has drawbacks
so we have chosen to relate membership to the relevant employment
statistics. This choice does not substantively affect the analysis
below.
2.For example Orley Ashenfelter and John H. Pencavel, "American Trade
Union Growth: 1900-1960," Quarterly Journal of Economcs, Vol. 83 #3
(August 1969), pp. 434-448, or more recently Farouk Elsheikh and
George Sayers Bain, "American Trade Union Growth: An Alternative
Model," Industrial Relations, Vol. 17 #1 (February 1978), pp. 75-79.
3.For example, Richard Freeman has argued this position, most recently
in "Why are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB Representation Elections?",
Harvardmimeo (1983)
4.NationalLabor Relations Board Annual Report,1949-1980. Webegin
analysisin 1949 because the number of workers in units choosing cer-
tification is not available before this date.
5.Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Labor Unions, 1979.
Membership for 1978-1980 was obtained by calling the BLS.18
6.Report of the Proceedings of the 74th Convention of the American
eration of Labor, 1955 and Proceedings and Executive Council Reports
of the AFL-CIO 14th Constitutional Convention, 1981.
7.Data on employment in construction was obtained from the 1982 Eco-
nomic Report of the President.Eligible voters in representation elec-
tions involving construction workers were obtained from NLRB Annual
Reports. Data on construction workers in units choosing representa-
tion was available in the NLRB Reports from 1965 on. For the period
before 1965 that number was estimated from the number of eligible
voters and the percent of elections won in the construction industry.
Counts of organized construction workers were available from the BLS
for even numbered years from 1956 to 1978. For the years 1949 to
1955, 1979 and 1980 estimates were constructed based on a regression
of construction union members on members of the Laborers union.
Membership was interpolated for odd numbered years between 1956 and
1978.
8.We conducted a survey of 30 states to determine the extent of national
labor union participation in state board elections. Weattempted to get
information from the ten states wth the greatest number of NLRBelec-
tions, the ten with the fewest, and ten others chosen at random. We
were able to contact state-boards (or ascertain for certain that there
was no board) in all but 5 states. For the states for which datawas
available the ratio of workers in NLRB elections to state boardsuper-
vised elections in 1980 was greater than 4 to 1.Further, of the
unions taking part in state board elections less than 40%were national19
labor unions which represent private sector workers. Thus, of the
new private sector national labor union members due to certification
elections, probably less than a 1/11th are due to state board certifica-
tions.
Some elections for railway workers and airline employees are
handled by the federal mediation service. However, the small number
of union members in these industries insures the insignificance of this
consideration.
9.These unions are a subset of the NLRB category "other local unions."
This category makes up less than 10% of all elections. (National Labor
Relations Board, Annual repots, 1949-1980).
10. From NLRB Election Reports: Six Month Surveys 1976-1981.
11. Paula Beth Voos, Labor Union Organizing Programs, 1954-1977, unpub-
lished Harvard Ph.D. dissertation (1982), argues that union organizing
expenditures increased from 1955-1975 in real terms and fell only
slightly relative to the number of unorganized workers. This may not
be inconsistent with the trend described here for two reasons. First,
Voos considers only those unions for which data on organizing is
available for all years.It is quite possible that those unions would be
the ones for which organizing is most important and which would have
the lowest reduction in expenditures. Other unions may be decreasing
their expenditures. Second, even if unions are increasing their expen-
ditures, other factors, such as management resistance, could be de-
creasing the number of workers involved in certification elections.20
12. Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, New Estimates of Private
Sector Unionism in the United States, Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol. 32 #2 (January 1979), P. 171, Table 8.
13. Richard Prosten, The Longest Season: Union Organizing in the Last
Decade, Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association,
Winter1979, p. 247.
14. Charles McDonald, Study of theSuccess in Obtaining Contracts After
Winningan NLRB Electionand After Obtaining a Bargaining Order,u
memorandum to the National Organizing Committee of the AFL-CIO,
February 18, 1983. The study covered elections conducted in April of
1979 through March of 1981.
15. Since the McDonald study suggests that the percent of cases where the
union fails to obtain a contract and the unit becomes inactive may be
increasing, results were also recomputed allowing for this possibility.
This reversed the slight downward trend in the net growth due to
"economic' causes and increased the de-acceleration of growth due to
organizing activity. The program and data used to do this calculation
and all others reported in this paper are available from the authors.
16. Considering the list of ways union membership maygrow or decline in
section I, the only possible complication to the interpretation of this
rate as due to "net economic" causes would be if a substantial number
of new units gained recognition from previously unorganized employers
without going through a certification election.Voos, Labor Union21
Organizing, pp. 178-179 suggests that this number has been quite
small during the period we are considering.
17.In fact, the graph of percent change in membership strongly resembles
that of a MA1 process (particularly in the early years). This is exact-
ly what one would expect if union membership was subject to measure-
ment error on a year to year basis. Thus a series smoothed with a
two or three period moving average might give a more accurate picture
of the true rates of change. That has not been done here.
18. The effect of slower growth of employment in union plants than in
non-union plants has never been empirically addressed. One advan-
tage of the approach adopted here is that it allows us to gauge the
relative importance of this effect.
19. The ueverything_else_held_the_same restriction here is more important
than usual. We would not really expect the rate of success to remain
unchanged if, for example, unions were able to substantively increase
organizing activity. Thus the rates that are being set equal to their
historic values are as much a part of the counter-factual as those
being set to some constant value. Given this caveat, it is clear that
fixing any one rate could not have maintained the early 50s membership
levels.
20. This is not to say that these rates have never been obtained. During
the late 1930s and early 40s, as the country was recovering from the
depression and immediately following the passage of the Wagner Act22
union membership grew by more than 3% of employed workers a year
on average. Such performance is clearly atypical. The early 50s are
not characterized by such major changes or economic extremes and
thus provide a better benchmark for evaluating recent history.
21. More strikingly, the percent organized would have fallen even if unions
had won every election they were involved in since 1950.
22. BLS, Directory of National Labor Unions, several years between 1950-
1979.
23. Two additional pieces of information supporting this view can be found
in recent work by Henry Farber and Richard Freeman. Henry Farber,
"The Extent of Unionization in the United States (1983), notes that
even if the industrial composition of U.S. employment hadn't changed
during the 70s the drop in the percent of the workforce organized
would only have been 16% smaller. Richard Freeman, 'Why are Unions
Faring Poorly in NLRB Representation Elections? (1983)," estimates a
model of union voting and shows that only 8% of the drop in success
rate can be accounted for by the change in the industry, occupational,
race and sex make up of the labor force.
24. Voos, "Labor Union Organizing . . . ," considers the effect of union
organizing expenditures. Other studies include Richard N. Bloch,
"Union Organizing and the Allocation of Union Resources," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 34, #1 (October 1980), pp. 101-113,
and Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Unions, Wages and Inflation (Washington,D.C.: Brookings, 1980), P. 270.
25. Voos, 'Labor Union Organizing .. . ," p.65, briefly considers the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Results of a Regression
of Net Growth Due to Economic Causes
on Percent Change in GNP and a Time Trend
Coefficients S.E. T-Statistic
Constant -4.702 1.545 -3.04
time trend .013 .057 .23







Rates Necessary to Maintain Percent
Organized at 36.1% Assuming
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FIGURE 5. CHANGE IN UNION MEMBERSHIP
-TotalUnion Growth
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